An interesting take on something we've been discussing....
Mike
Toward a Generally Censorious Climate
by Marcus Verhaegh <mailto:afterthefact@rocketmail.com>
by Marcus Verhaegh
There are folk - value-relativists I will term them - who take
libertarianism not merely to be a theory of rights; but as itself a
being a guide to the good life.
The idea here would be that we ought to generally give up on trying to
socially promote rules concerning the good life, even when such
promotion is non-coercive. So, for example, one might refuse to hire
people who denounce one's religion. While such actions would be within
one's rights, taking libertarianism as a guide to the good life might
lead one to conclude that it would be better to let the potential
employee develop their ideas un-hindered by the crude prodding of your
blacklisting. (I tend to associate this position with a lot of the
material at Reason magazine, although thankfully it does not appear
throughout all the articles of this fine publication.) After all, since
it is impossible to have knowledge of a correct comparison of
intersubjective valuations of goods, it is not clear why one would
attempt to change others' valuation in any specific way. It is certainly
fine to provide some kind of stimulation for other's thinking, but, in
the end, they have to make their own valuations. Who am I to say that
another's valuations are incorrect? All I can really concern myself with
is whether rights are violated.
This is an interesting line of argument, but one that is wholly without
real grounding. For among the things I can value is: others engaging in
behavior different from that which they are currently engaging in; and
others having thoughts different (in specific ways) from those they
currently have. Who is the value-relativist to tell me that I cannot
have such valuations, after all?
Well, clearly the value-relativist is someone who has valuations about
how I ought to behave. So it cannot be a question of simply ruling out
such valuations tout court. Perhaps it is a case of arguing that one
should not use one's non-coercive abilities to keep certain ideas from
gaining widespread circulation? Well, this can't be it either, as such
would involve ruling out providing critical reasoning on other's ideas,
and apparently the value-relativist libertarian is interesting in
providing such reasoning - regardless of its "chilling effect."
To be honest, I am not sure what the value-relativist libertarian is
after. It seems to have something to do with denouncing certain
attitudes toward "culture." Specifically, the value-relativist seems
suspicious of culture as an ideal to be promoted, since such promotion
involves using non-coercive means (withholding funds for non-esteemed
projects, funding valued projects, hiring admired individuals,
blacklisting non-desirables, etc.) that may be grossly out of step with
other's valuations.
Culture is essentially a social entity; the radical individualism of
value-relativist libertarianism thus has little place for "culture,"
except as a way of referring to the totality of human-created objects
and practices that one might take up or contemplate. And so the
value-relativist is only interested in "more," not "better." We need
more "options" from which to choose, and never mind that adding some
options will inevitably remove others. Thus illegal immigration from
Mexico is praised by the value-relativist because it puts us more in
contact with Mexican culture, giving us further cultural choices; but
who cares that such immigration necessarily detracts from possibilities
for valued forms of cultural unity in the previously Anglo-American or
African-American neighborhoods that receive the new arrivals? These
choices are neglected, because they involve using non-coercive means
(withholding right of entrance to private property, or to the public
property that is jointly owned by the American citizenry) to promote a
vision of the good life even among others who might not always share
one's vision.
A true market sensibility is one that realizes that even the adding of
options often has a cost; one that not all market players may be willing
to accept. One individual values the availability of the Howard Stern
show; another values its un-availability. So long as non-coercive means,
such as consumer boycotts, cartel systems that blacklist, etc., are used
to achieve either proposed end - a counter-factual situation, of course
- then there is little point in speaking of failure to live up to market
ideals. One can only debate the relative value of attaining the
availability of the Howard Stern show, vs. the value of attaining its
un-availability.
It might be thought that Americans should be able to purchase the
cultural artifacts that that they like "as cheaply as possible." But
why? What I would argue, to the contrary, is that most Americans need
guidance from their cultural betters; and that that guidance should
involve efforts to create higher prices for those artifacts that the
cultured judge to be un-worthy (relative to other cultural goods that
might be offered instead), and lower prices for those artifacts that the
cultured judged quite worthy. Now unfortunately, I don't have the
capital required to make quite the progress I would like in enacting my
vision - a vision which of course include some rather particular ideas
on who counts as Americans' cultural betters. But I am hopeful that a
team effort could make a dent - if it weren't for the government
constantly destroying much of the needed capital for the project, while
also re-directing much of what remains from talented individuals of
taste, to various social parasites who seem largely intent on subverting
the culture that I value.
In any case, a rigorous, generally censorious, but market-based climate
is needed to provide guidance to the masses who - probably due to
statism - have wandered far, far from the path of good taste and sacred
culture. Private censorship is vital to the preservation of true
pluralism. Without it, there is an inevitable tendency to move from
preservation of a variety of plausible viewpoints, to the preservation
only of relativistic ones. Certainly, different kinds of censorship are
needed in different times and places, and it is true that in certain
forums, such as university ones, the censorship required involves a
lightness of touch that gives much room even to ideas that initially
seem absurd or evil. But in other contexts, crude blacklists and angry
boycotts work best.
To claim otherwise, and suggest the feverish wants of the masses need to
be respected over higher cultural aspirations, is to take up the
materialist project begun by Epicurus and Lucretius, and continued with
such disastrous effects in Marx. This brand of materialism, which sees
traditional religious belief as a tool by which to reify illegitimate
social orders, has of course today morphed into a race- and
gender-centered neo-Marxism. In this contemporary materialist view,
there is ultimately only pleasure, license, and oppression. Culture, in
its true form, is for the materialist only oppression of one sort or
another. Of the Aristotelian and Aquinian hope that the virtuous might
lead the community, precious little remains.
March 8, 2004
Marcus Verhaegh [send him mail <mailto:afterthefact@…> ] is
an instructor in philosophy at Kent State University. Here is his
philosophy website <http://marcus-philosophy.com> .
Copyright (c) 2004 LewRockwell.com
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Mike