Jeremy,
Further responses below...
> It seems to me that it could have been these and other positive
> measures, and not Ataturk's controls on free speech or other
> authoritarian methods, that were responsible for Turks generally
> deciding to embrace a more Western model of multiparty democracy
> rather than ending up like Iran. Iran, let's not forget, also had a
> strongman leader in the person of the Shah who used authoritarian
> tactics to move the country in a "modern" Western direction -- but of
> course in Iran the approach backfired and resulted in hardline
> Islamic fundamentalists seizing power.
Yes, in Iran this approach failed, but nevertheless Ataturk used the same
type of program as the Shah did in Iran, simply in a more successful way.
The difference between the cultures of 1970s Iran and 1920s Turkey is
huge, however...one of the largest differences being that modern Iranians
largely like the West, and are attracted to Western culture. If it wasn't
for the extremely anti-Western government leaders, they would probably
have a much freer society because the sort of social repression that
pervades many Muslim cultures is not nearly as present in Iran.
So let me get this straight. Are you suggesting that the authoritarian imposition of more pro-freedom Western values failed in 1970s Iran while it succeeded in 1920s Turkey because Iranians in the '70s were already *more* attracted to Western culture and modernity than were Turks in the '20s? I realize things in politics can often be counter-intuitive, but common sense would suggest that all else being equal, the greater the cultural change an authoritarian regime tries to impose by force on a society, the more of a backlash there would tend to be.
Turkey was very different. Simply giving more freedom to the public would
not change their extremely repressive and anti-Western culture, which
Ataturk knew very well. Things like women being more involved in
professional life had to be encouraged and coerced by the government...it
was not simply enough to remove legal restrictions. Libertarians often
have a hard time understanding that whether or not something is prohibited
by law doesn't really matter if it there is a strong cultural prohibition
already in place. Unless Ataturk had banned the veil, women would have
been forced to wear it by the repressive culture of the time, and unless
religion had been forcibly suppressed, it would have continued to exert a
cultural influence that would have made all the legal reforms irrelevant.
The government truly had to BUILD a new culture through social
engineering, dragging the Turks, kicking and screaming, into the modern
age.
Sixty years ago, almost all United Statian men wore similarly styled hats in public, and a very narrow range of clothing styles; arguably they were forced to do so by the repressive culture of the time. But these conformist customs mostly went away on their own, without government banning men's hats or three piece suits. Similarly, women were able to gain the choice of wearing pants, without government banning dresses. Why do you think the veil in Turkey would have been different?
> It also seems possible that the problems Turkey has today with the
> Kurds may be largely rooted in, or at least exacerbated by, Ataturk's
> legacy. Kreiser writes:
>
> "The Turkish military commanders, however [presumably including
> Ataturk], were convinced of the superiority of their culture and
> language over all other Islamic groups, especially the Kurds."
This is absolutely true. Unfortunately the building of Turkish
nationalism under Ataturk generally was not good for the minorities within
Turkey. However, in this case, I think the alternatives were nationalism
and the kind of theocratic tribal rule common in many Muslim societies
throughout time. Neither is ideal, but I think one of the biggest errors
of the neoconservatives is thinking that an American-style "post-national"
state is possible for everyone. I just don't think many cultures at this
point can handle such a thing, and unfortunately it may take a very long
time for them to come around to post-national thinking like we have in the
USA.
I wish I could call the thinking in the U.S. "post-nationalist." I'm afraid it's still very nationalist. Perhaps what you mean is that in the United States race and religion are no longer closely bound up with national identity.
> Anyway, if you have convincing information that it was
> *specifically* the authoritarian measures Ataturk implemented that
> put Turkey on a positive path for the future, and not other reforms
> of his regime's which we can all agree were positive, I am certainly
> open to hearing it.
I think the general consensus among historians is that the repression of
religion was an important part of building Turkey as a modern state, and I
haven't really seen any evidence (from you or others) that such measures
weren't necessary.
I think you're right that this is the general consensus, but I question the validity of the conclusion in the same way I question the consensus opinion that FDR's policies and World War II got the United States out of the Depression. And I tend to think that the burden of proof should be on those who want government to violate peoples' rights, since that is a *certain* negative.
Furthermore, looking at modern Turkey currently, it's
obvious that they have a serious problem with political Islam right now.
The population STILL does not really support a secular modern government,
even after decades of indoctrination...though certainly religious
fundamentalism is less strong than it was in the 1920s.
Could this be partly a reaction against the indoctrination? In many of the other countries where Islamic fundamentalism has become a problem (e.g. Egypt, Algeria), governments also engaged in serious authoritarian suppression of Islam.
Because of this
they voted in a very anti-secular party that is trying to change the
secular nature of the state, and may have to be put down by the courts who
are considering banning the AKP. This shows that you still can't trust
the people with total freedom, as if the majority of people would vote a
party like AKP into power, it's pretty likely they would also favor taking
Turkey backwards to a more socially conservative state.
While I tend to see this as most likely being the result of bad past policies, it does still present a genuine dilemma today. If a majority would vote for taking away rights, should anti-democratic steps be taken to prevent the majority from so acting? Fortunately the moderate Islamic party that is now in power in Turkey (is that the AKP?) does not seem particularly bent on taking away rights.
Restricting the
freedom of the public to advocate for such measures may still be
necessary, as unfortunate a conclusion as that may be for me and most
libertarians.
Why would this be "unfortunate" from the utilitarian perspective that you believe in, if it's what works best? Do you agree, with those of us who believe in the Non-Aggression Principle, that there is something inherently undesirable about restricting free speech? If so, what's wrong with it?
Love & Liberty,
((( starchild )))