Voting anomalies

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The RISKS digest[1] has a summary of reported election anomalies in the
latest issue:

<URL: >

Included is a note about SF's ranked-choice voting problem:

The failure of the ES&S ranked-choice vote-counting software in the San
Francisco Supervisors' election that I noted in RISKS-23.58 turns out to
have been a hard-coded constant maximum number of voters that was set too
low. The fix was utterly trivial, but wisely required recertification by
the State. [Perhaps the same programmer wrote the Broward software?]

Dumb, stupid, and dumb. For the non-geeks, this is a simple and well-known
error to avoid, akin to the Y2K bug of assuming that a two-digit year will
be sufficient. The program broke because too many people voted.


[1] The "Forum On Risks To The Public In Computers And Related Systems" of the
Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Association for Computing
Machinery (ACM); see <URL: >.
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Christopher R. Maden, Principal Consultant, crism consulting
<URL: >
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